Monday, June 8, 2015

[Philip] Marconi with a bunt single to start a big inning !!

Mitchell McRoy
Flip Marconi with a bunt single to start a big inning !! 
MY SON!!! The USMC Veteran!! Love this guy!!! Loves baseball with a PASSION.
Have to watch this!!! Watch how he out-psyches the pitcher!!!!
So proud of this man!!!






    



  • Jerry Gustoso Nice field were is it?


  • Lou Marconi ...his field?!?!? Sheridan-Parkside Diamonds~~~~under-the-lights!!!


  • Lou Marconi Town of TONAWANDA, NY 14150


  • Lou Marconi ...they take care of the diamonds well, in Tonawanda!!


  • Jerry Gustoso God bless him


  • Jerry Gustoso I could see that Lou



    • Write a reply...

  • Lou Marconi Thank you, Jerry Gustoso~~~I will pass that sentiment on to him!!


  • Jerry Gustoso Have a good night Lou

  • Lou Marconi Jerry Gustoso~~~~you as well, my good man!!


  • Leana Elam Super fast runner down the base line to first.




  • John L Lochbaum VERY NICE,LOOKED LIKE HE WAS SWINGING FOR THE FENCES,,,,LOL AWSOME LOU..OUTSTANDING..HAS SOME WHEELS ALSO .BLAZED TO FIRST...CONGRATS


  • Leana Elam I just noticed that he is a leftie at bat!


  • Victor Marconi That's our Philip. Did you win this game? What ball park did you play this game in?


  • Lou Marconi The Classic-Clinic on The Bunt. Notice how the batter is STILL holding onto his 'hitting-away' stance, even as the pitcher is in his wind-up. The batter still does not betray his intent to bunt; does not square-around in the batter's box, until the pitcher has released the ball. In effect, the catcher, the pitcher, and the whole infield is still 'playing' straight-away. The batter is so confident of the bunt execution that he is off-to-the-races, before the catcher gets up, and out of his 'box' to retrieve the ball that both the catcher and the pitcher, is scrambling to get a handle on. Speed?!?!? The batter is half-way along the right-field base path, by the time the toss from the catcher, gets to the first baseman!! USMC CPL Philip Louis Marconi (ret)~~~is available for a TRYOUT.
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HICKOK



NB:     The field that this game was played at:







Monday, June 1, 2015

TRUDY RUBIN, INQUIRER OPINION COLUMNIST---Assistance to the rebels battling ISIS


After ISIS captured the key Iraqi city of Ramadi last week, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter blamed the stunning loss on "a failure of the Iraqi forces to fight." Allied air strikes were "effective," he said, but the Iraqis lacked the will to confront ISIS.
That careless TV sound bite sums up why the administration's efforts to degrade and defeat ISIS are stalling. You'd never know from Carter's complaint that U.S. tactical and strategic errors, including an ineffective air campaign, contributed mightily to the debacle.
On a trip to Iraq last month, during which I spoke with tribal sheikhs and officials from Anbar province (in which Ramadi sits), these errors were painfully apparent.
Here are a couple of the most glaring reasons for the loss of Ramadi, which, if not addressed, will permit the ISIS threat to grow.
First, and most obvious, is the U.S. failure to adequately help Sunni Iraqis who want to fight ISIS. Nearly all the Iraqi territory the jihadi group has seized lies in provinces such as Anbar and Nineveh, where the population is almost entirely Sunni Muslim. One big reason Ramadi fell was that U.S. policy has failed to help those Sunnis fight back.
Some Sunni tribal leaders at first welcomed ISIS as a preferable alternative to the previous Shiite sectarian prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki. But many Sunni tribal leaders and politicians opposed ISIS from the beginning, and others, chafing under the jihadis' rule, now want to oust them.
Yet U.S. strategy has failed to help the Sunni fighters best placed to drive the jihadis out.
The administration recognizes that ISIS cannot be defeated without the buy-in of Sunni tribes. The Iraqi army cannot do it, and sending Iran-backed Shiite militias to do the job will only increase sectarian bloodshed.
As President Obama told the Atlantic Monthly last week: "There's no doubt that in the Sunni areas, we're going to have to ramp up not just training, but also commitment, and we better get Sunni tribes more activated than they currently have been."
Well, what is the president waiting for?
The U.S. program for helping Sunni fighters in Anbar province, many of whom fought alongside American troops against al-Qaeda during the last decade, has been incoherent. U.S. military officers are struggling hard to make it work, but have not been given the tools.
Sunni tribal forces have no clear leadership or mission, in large part because the Iraqi government has refused to authorize a national guard system in which they could form provincial fighting units. The Obama administration has failed to use its leverage either to squeeze Baghdad to endorse a national guard or to provide the tribal fighters with the weapons they need. U.S. officers are stretched thin and have trained only a small number of tribesmen.
In addition, the tribes have been given only a limited supply of light weapons by the government to confront ISIS fighters in armored vehicles fielding heavy artillery and wielding truck bombs.
"The government left us by ourselves to fight ISIS," I was told by Ahmed Sajer Jasim, a sheikh of the Malahma, who live between Ramadi and the ISIS-controlled town of Fallujah. "We were the first to stand against ISIS, and we asked for help but nobody came."
"The government promised a lot," said Sheikh Ziyad Mnajed al-Suleiman, who comes from Ramadi, "but it was all empty words. If the Americans assisted them, all the tribes would fight back."
But effective American assistance would require embedding special-forces operatives with the Sunni tribes to help coordinate their fight. It would require providing them with intelligence and better weapons. It would also require the administration to lean on Baghdad to assure Sunnis they had a future inside Iraq.
So far there's no sign that Obama is willing to invest the energy that is needed (and I don't mean ground troops, but I do mean more resources and more attention). Without that White House focus, the ISIS problem will grow worse.
The second most obvious flaw in the administration's strategy concerns U.S. air strikes. One reason Ramadi fell was because U.S. strikes on ISIS came too late and couldn't hit key targets, such as truck bombs that broke through Iraqi military defenses. Iraqis are bewildered that U.S. pilots can't stop ISIS caravans of truck bombs traveling on open roads.
Talk about a sand-storm hampering the pilots is another excuse for inaction. The real problem: The administration has refused to permit U.S. advisers or forward air controllers to embed with Iraqi units, which means that the pilots lack sufficient ground intelligence and, as a result, U.S. air sorties are often ineffective. News reports say that 75 percent of U.S. air combat missions in Iraq and Syria return to base without firing a weapon or dropping a bomb.
I could go on listing the flaws in the U.S. strategy - such as the lack of any plan for Syria - but the biggest flaw lies elsewhere. It revolves around whether the White House is committed to fighting the jihadis in a way that will produce results.
To use Ash Carter's term, it is a question of the "will to fight" ISIS. But it is not the Iraqis' will. It is Obama's that is in question, and the verdict is still out.


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Hickok

Wednesday, May 27, 2015

Charles Krauthammer: You Want Hypotheticals? Here's One.....................................

Charles Krauthammer: You want hypotheticals? Here's one..............................


It’s Obama who lost Iraq: To ask the right hypothetical questions, it's imperative to understand that fact



Ramadi falls. The Iraqi army flees. The great 60-nation anti-Islamic State coalition so grandly proclaimed by the Obama administration is nowhere to be seen. Instead, it’s the defense minister of Iran who flies into Baghdad, an unsubtle demonstration of who’s in charge — while the U.S. air campaign proves futile and America’s alleged strategy for combating the Islamic State is in free fall.
It gets worse. The Gulf States’ top leaders, betrayed and bitter, ostentatiously boycott President Obama’s failed Camp David summit. “We were America’s best friend in the Arab world for 50 years,” laments Saudi Arabia’s former intelligence chief.
Note: “were,” not “are.”
We are scraping bottom. Following six years of Obama’s steady and determined withdrawal from the Middle East, America’s standing in the region has collapsed. And yet the question incessantly asked of the various presidential candidates is not about that.
It’s a retrospective hypothetical: Would you have invaded Iraq in 2003 if you had known then what we know now?

First, the question is not just a hypothetical, but an inherently impossible hypothetical. It contradicts itself. Had we known there were no weapons of mass destruction, the very question would not have arisen. The premise of the war — the basis for going to the UN, to the Congress and, indeed, to the nation — was Iraq’s possession of WMD in violation of the central condition for the ceasefire that ended the first Gulf War. No WMD, no hypothetical to answer in the first place.
Second, the “if you knew then” question implicitly locates the origin and cause of the current disasters in 2003 . As if the fall of Ramadi was predetermined then, as if the author of the current regional collapse is George W. Bush.
This is nonsense. The fact is that by the end of Bush’s tenure, the war had been won. You can argue that the price of that victory was too high. Fine. We can debate that until the end of time.
But what is not debatable is that it was a victory. Bush bequeathed to Obama a success. By whose measure? By Obama’s. As he told the troops at Fort Bragg on Dec. 14, 2011, “We are leaving behind a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative government that was elected by its people.” This was, said the President, a “moment of success.”




Which Obama proceeded to fully squander. With the 2012 election approaching, he chose to liquidate our military presence in Iraq. We didn’t just withdraw our forces. We abandoned, destroyed or turned over our equipment, stores, installations and bases.
We surrendered our most valuable strategic assets, such as control of Iraqi airspace, soon to become the indispensable conduit for Iran to supply and sustain the Assad regime in Syria and cement its influence all the way to the Mediterranean.
And, most relevant to the fall of Ramadi, we abandoned the vast intelligence network we had so painstakingly constructed in Anbar province, without which our current patchwork operations there are largely blind and correspondingly feeble.
The current collapse was not predetermined in 2003 but in 2011. Isn’t that what should be asked of Hillary Clinton? We know you think the invasion of 2003 was a mistake. But what about the abandonment of 2011? Was that not a mistake?
Mme. Secretary: When you arrived at State, Al Qaeda in Iraq had been crushed and expelled from Anbar. The Iraqi government had from Basra to Sadr City fought and defeated the radical, Iranian-proxy Shiite militias. Yet today these militias are back, once again dominating Baghdad. On your watch, we gave up our position as the dominant influence over a “sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq” — forfeiting that position gratuitously to Iran. Was that not a mistake? And where were you when it was made?
Iraq is now a battlefield between the Sunni jihadists of the Islamic State and the Shiite jihadists of Iran’s Islamic Republic. There is no viable center. We abandoned it. The Obama administration’s unilateral pullout created a vacuum for the entry of the worst of the worst.
And the damage was self-inflicted. The current situation in Iraq, says David Petraeus, “is tragic foremost because it didn’t have to turn out this way. The hard-earned progress of the surge was sustained for over three years.”
Do the math. That’s 2009 through 2011, the first three Obama years. And then came the unraveling. When? The last U.S. troops left Iraq on Dec. 18, 2011.
Want to do retrospective hypotheticals? Start there.

Free USMC CPL Amir Hektami

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HICKOK